## Roscoe Drummond Reports


## **U-2 Probe Seen Revealing** Loose Rein Before Summit

WASHINGTON.

The thoroughly-fair-minded Fulbright committee hearing is revealing some grave shortcomings in the Administration's handling of the U-2 plane incident, although one aspect of the President's conduct of the affair seems to me to be strengthened.

of whether the U-2 flights should be sus- aging to have to admit that the pended prior to the summit. This suggests matter was not even considered a grievous oversight and a looseness of reins at the highest level of generaat the top of an operation, which by any standard demanded close and continuous scrutiny.

The hearing has also revealed a gaping take open responsibility for the lack of co-ordination among the White flights was not easual: it was House, the Central Intelligence Agency and deliberate. Apparently Mr. the National Recommends and Space Agency, Eigenhower felt with some realized between the State Department and its ion that Mr. Khrushchev was



pend this program of flights, proceed to go along with the summit meeting approached, was a sound, depression of them?"

a careful "decision" by 'how in authority. He pressed Mr. Herter 🏗 say who made the decision, and whether there was thorough consideration of summit consequences. The Secretary was forced to back away. from his contention that the Administration reviewed the flights in light of the summill This fact emerges from the fo. lowing Q-and-A:

Fulbright-"Was such a de cision taken?"

you, I was not a par w to when

Fulbright-"You say trate (1) decision not to sus; and sta flights as the summit approveded was a sound decision.' Was there any decision taken not to suspend them?"

Herter "I did not interpose any objection to (them) because of any diplomatic event to suspend them, is that cor-Herter-"That is right."

There you are. There can be an honest difference of opinion whether the flights should have The most damaging disclosure is that there was never any been suspended on the eve of considered, specific high-level examination the summit. It is certainly damaging to have to admit that the ment

The President's decision the National Aeronauties and Space Agency. Eisenhower felt with some Year and between the State Department and its son that Mr. Khrushchev, was official spokesman, which resulted in contradictory and embarrassing public statements.

On the other hand, Mr. Risenhower's reasons for telling the obvious but railed knowledge and approval. He concluded that any such an out would not keep the Soviets from using the incident to explode the persuasive in light of the testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. such a disclaimer so he could come back with the argument Understandably Secretary Herter sought to put the beat come back with the United States warpossible face upon the Administration's Juncting of the whole that the United States warpossible face upon the Administration's Juncting of the whole that the United States warpossible face upon the Administration's Juncting of the whole that the United States warpossible face upon the Administration's Juncting of the whole that the United States warpossible face upon the Administration's Juncting of the whole that the United States warpossible face upon the Administration's Juncting of the whole that the United States warpossible face upon the Administration's Juncting of the whole that the United States warpossible face upon the Administration's Juncting of the whole that the United States warpossible face upon the Administration's Juncting of the whole the United States warpossible face upon the Administration's Juncting of the Whole that the United States warpossible face upon the Administration of the Whole the United States warpossible face upon the Administration of the Whole the United States warpossible face upon the Unite

The Administration can rea ispend them?"


Sonably contend that since Mr.

Khrushchev negotiated with the

Rerter—"I shink that is the President at Camp David know-

But on balance it is clear that the Administration's handling of the matter showed grave de-ful encies and will be a legitithese aspect of campaign debate e, 1984, N.Y. Heruld Tribune Inc.





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